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109and disease-related changes, have been the subject of much research. These include brain reserve,
cognitive reserve, and brain maintenance. However, different investigators have use these terms in
different ways, and there has never been an attempt to arrive at consensus on the definition of these
concepts. Furthermore, there has been confusion regarding the measurement of these constructs and
the appropriate ways to apply them to research. Therefore the reserve, resilience, and protective fac-
tors professional interest area, established under the auspices of the Alzheimer’s Association, estab-
lished a whitepaper workgroup to develop consensus definitions for cognitive reserve, brain reserve,
and brain maintenance. The workgroup also evaluated measures that have been used to implement
these concepts in research settings and developed guidelines for research that explores or utilizes
these concepts. The workgroup hopes that this whitepaper will form a reference point for researchersdeclared that no conflict of interest exists.
thor. Tel.: 1212-342-1350; fax: 1212-342-1838.
E-mail address: ys11@columbia.edu
/j.jalz.2018.07.219
blished by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of the Alzheimer’s Association.
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179in this area and facilitate research by supplying a common language.
 2018 Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of the Alzheimer’s Association.180
































The study of what makes people with certain life histories
resilient against agingordisease is important because it has im-
plications for policy and intervention; however, there are likely
several complex and highly interactive mechanisms that lead
to these individual differences in vulnerability to decline.
Reserve is a heuristic to help explain individual differ-
ences in cognition, function, or clinical status relative to ag-
ing and brain disease. There are many potential mechanisms
implicated in this complex construct, probably reliant on
both structural and functional brain mechanisms. Resilience
is a more general term referring to multiple reserve-related
processes. Therefore, the proposed nomenclature focuses
on definitions and measures of cognitive reserve (CR), brain
reserve (BR), and brain maintenance (BM), as well as expec-
tations for research derived from those concepts.
Definitions ofCR,BR, andBMare evolving, as are theways
in which these constructs are best studied. As such, the ideas
presented here are offered as a conceptual framework that
will propagate in defining, measuring, and studying reserve.
In addition, this paper iswritten in the context of cognitive aging
and brain pathologies such as Alzheimer’s disease (AD).
Further work may be needed to ensure that these definitions





























2.1. Definition of CR
The term CR refers to the adaptability (i.e., efficiency, ca-
pacity, flexibility [For tentative definitions of these concepts,
refer to the section on functional imaging approaches to
measuring CR.]) of cognitive processes that helps to explain
differential susceptibility of cognitive abilities or day-to-day
function to brain aging, pathology, or insult. At the brain
level of analysis, CR is proposed to be supported by more
adaptable functional brain processes. Functional brain pro-
cesses refer to the networks of brain regions associated
with performing a task and the pattern of interactions be-
tween these networks.
Differences in CR are accordingly determined by individ-
ual differences in these existing cognitive or functional brain
processes. These processes can be influenced by the interac-
tion of innate (e.g., in utero, or genetically determined) indi-
vidual differences and lifetime exposures. CR is therefore
not fixed or immutable. Relevant lifetime exposures include,
but are not limited to, early-life general cognitive ability
(e.g., intelligence), education, occupation, physical exercise,
leisure activities, or social engagement.REV 5.5.0 DTD  JALZ2736_proof CR is an active model of reserve, meaning that dynamic
cognitive and underlying functional brain processes cope with
brain changes or damage. This does not connote that these
cognitive processes must be invoked intentionally. When age-
or disease-related brain changes occur, individual differences
in the cognitive processes can influence how successfully a per-
son can copewith these changes.The cognitive/functional brain
processes that support CR may already be present before the
onset of brain pathologies. Alternately, when challenged with
age- or disease-related brain changes, there may be individual
differences in the need or ability to adapt new, or compensatory
cognitive/functional processes to maintain function.2.2. Measures of CR
As a theoretical construct, CR has rarely been assessed
directly. The closest direct measure of CR may stem from
characterization and measurement of functional brain pro-
cesses, but even those studies do not necessarily directly
measure CR because they are typically embedded in a partic-
ular methodology and set of conditions as mentioned below.
Rather, studies often rely on the following three broad
methods to quantify and measure CR.
2.2.1. Sociobehavioral proxies of CR
From the outset, researchers have relied on “convenience
proxies,” sociobehavioral indices assumed to covary with
and indeed contribute to the development of CR. These
include education, IQ, occupational complexity, leisure
and physical activity, and other protective factors that have
been identified, most often in epidemiologic research.
Clearly, such factors are global in nature and do not imply
any specific functional mechanisms. Rather, they are forma-
tive, meaning that they attempt to represent those experi-
ences that contribute to the development of CR.
Accordingly, proxies must be used cautiously and not be
treated as direct measures of CR. Rather, they must always
be considered in the context in which they were originally
discovered, that is, the degree to which they might account
for individual differences in the relationship between the un-
derlying brain state and level of function. As a case in point,
the observation that educational attainment is associated
with reduced age-specific risk of developing Alzheimer’s
dementia could suggest that individuals with higher educa-
tion can “cope with” greater severity of AD-related brain
changes before becoming demented. When in vivo
biomarker imaging or postmortem data confirm greater
severity of Alzheimer’s pathology along with relatively14 September 2018  3:29 pm  ce
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377preserved functioning for individuals with higher education,
this interpretation about CR is more justifiable.
Recent advances in molecular genetics have enabled the
calculation of polygenic risk scores for CR proxies such as
educational attainment and general cognitive ability. This
may provide an alternate approach for estimating some CR
proxy scores.
Because CR is dynamic and influenced by different expo-
sures across the lifespan, it is likely that each of its compo-
nent lifestyle proxy factors could contribute uniquely to CR.
Some researchers have studied individual factors in isola-
tion, in permutation, or synthesized into a summary mea-
sure. Summary proxies for CR need to take care not to
simply identify shared variance among purported protective
factors, as this could fail to capture the unique contributions
of individual exposures. Also, such commonalities might be
related to factors other than reserve. Still, summary CRmea-
sures could be useful in clinical or research situations.
When there is evidence for a CR proxy, further under-
standing of whether the proxy is a causal factor or reflective
of reverse causation is important. For example, engagement
in cognitive activities might contribute to CR and be associ-
ated with reduced risk of dementia, but it is also possible that
people reduce these activities in the prodromal phase of de-
mentia and therefore appear to have lower CR. These deter-
minations are made more complex with summary proxies
because the constituent elements may not operate in the
same way.
2.2.2. Residual approaches to quantify CR
Recently, several investigators have used a “residual”
approach to measuring CR. This approach models demo-
graphic and brain predictors of cognition and treats the vari-
ance in cognition that is not explained by these predictors as
a measure of current CR. The validity of this approach is
dependent on the specification of the predictors and outcome
measure in the model. Brain measures that are used to pre-
dict cognition may only partially capture underlying brain
physiology and pathology. The residual approach may share
limitations of the composite approach using observed life-
style variables described previously: when defining CR by
that, which is not explained by known brain predictors, there
is a high risk of including many things other than reserve.
Also, the use of this approach will necessarily differ from
study to study, depending on what set of predictor and
outcome variables are used, and introduce variability across
studies. On the other hand, this approach has advantages: it is
a more direct measure of CR, and it is potentially dynamic,
changing as CR is built up or depleted. The residual
approach to CR may therefore be more informative at the in-
dividual level. Thus, this approach is worthy of further
exploration.
2.2.3. Functional imaging approaches to measuring CR
Various functional imaging approaches have been used to
try to capture the “neural implementation” of CR. One goalREV 5.5.0 DTD  JALZ2736_proof is to identify resting state or task-related functional activa-
tion brain networks that may underlie CR in that their
expression (1) is associated with typical reserve sociobeha-
vioral proxies and (2) moderates the effect of brain changes
on cognition. If such networks are identified and validated,
their degree of expression in any individual may be a more
direct measure of CR than other types of proxies. A chal-
lenging issue here is that activation networks may be specific
to given tasks and also dependent on the specific brain re-
gions that are or are not affected. Identification of CR net-
works that are active across multiple tasks or generic
resting networks may be productive in this setting. Such
generic networks still may not provide a complete explana-
tion for CR. For instance, it is possible that CR is subserved
through neuronal processing mechanisms that cut across
functional imaging designs such as more flexible connec-
tions, or greater dynamic range or responsivity. For these
questions, other modalities for studying the brain may be
indicated. There is also a clear need for a conceptual coun-
terpart to this idea at the neurobiological levels of molecules,
cells, and systems.3. Brain reserve
3.1. Definitions of BR
Brain reserve is commonly conceived as neurobiological
capital (numbers of neurons, synapses, etc.). BR implies that
individual variation in the structural characteristics of the
brain allows some people to better cope with brain aging
and pathology than others before clinical or cognitive
changes emerge. At any point in time, BR is a fixed construct
(i.e., the neurobiological capital available at that time), but
see the definition of BM below for how life experience can
potentially add to BR.
Cognitive or functional deficits would only occur after a
certain fixed threshold has been reached, and in those with
greater BR, there would simply be “more to lose” before
cognitive or functional impairment emerges. BR can there-
fore be considered a more passive form of reserve in that
it does not invoke active adaptation of functional or cogni-
tive processes in the presence of insult as does CR.
Despite the explicit reference to neurobiological sub-
strate, there is a need for identification of corresponding con-
cepts in neurobiology and for models at the level of cells and
molecules. So far, BR refers to a rather macroscopic
construct that is not linked to identifiable neurobiological
causes or mechanisms of finer granularity.
Colloquially, BR might be considered the “hardware,”
whereas CR would be the “software.” This distinction is
convenient, but not completely accurate, because cognition
must have a biological basis. In other words, even the CR
“software”must rely on underlying cellular/molecularmech-
anisms. Because of the blurred distinction, the term
“wetware” (referring to the amalgamated interaction of hard-
ware and software) has occasionally been used to describe14 September 2018  3:29 pm  ce
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496this particular relationship in the brain. Still, at this point, it is
not possible to map CR (or any cognitive process) onto
defined biological phenomena in a one-to-one, straightfor-
ward, or even linear way. Thus, the current definitions of
CR and BR are made at qualitatively different levels. These
distinctions may be replaced in the future as our knowledge
progresses. Integration with concepts at the cellular and mo-
lecular level will be necessary, and the integration will call
for systems neuroscience approaches that transcend tradi-
tional boundaries of research domains and disciplines.
Another reason for an operational distinction between BR
andCR is that the two account for unique portions of the vari-
ance in clinical or cognitive status. The distinction is also
conceptually important because CR is an active, dynamic
process, whereas BR is passive. Finally, it is useful to distin-
guish between BR and CR because they tend to map onto
different techniques used in our neuroimaging research;
that is, structural and functional methods, respectively.
3.2. Measures of BR
Theoretically, BR encompasses all the anatomical or
structural aspects of the brain that could be measured using
in vivo or postmortem techniques, but exclusive of neuropa-
thology such as AD plaques and tangles, and infarcts,
because BR is hypothesized to be protective against these.
In practice, this differentiation is challenging because pa-
thology and BR can be expressed in the same brain areas.
Historically, researchers have also used proxies to esti-
mate this BR, including gross whole-brain measures reflec-
tive of peak or premorbid brain volume, including
intracranial volume, or even head circumference. More
recently, researchers have begun to incorporate more fine-
grained measures such as specific patterns of gray matter
volume, cortical surface area, cortical thickness, PET mea-
sures of synaptic integrity, or white matter microstructural
properties. However, these approaches need to carefully
distinguish between those structural characteristics totemic
to BR as opposed to those simply reflective of neuropatho-
logic volume loss secondary to insult (e.g., atrophy second-
ary to stroke, AD). A further complication is that some of
these brain markers (e.g., cortical thickness or brain volume)
might reflect a combination of BR and BM when measured















4.1. Definitions of BM
While BR refers to the neurobiological capital at any
point in time, BM is defined as reduced development over
time of age-related brain changes and pathology based on
genetics or lifestyle. BM also reflects the fundamental notion
that the brain is modifiable based on experience. Genetics
and lifestyle, including many of the same life exposures
associated with differential CR, can impact BM. This can
lead to individual differences in morphologic brain declineREV 5.5.0 DTD  JALZ2736_proof associated with normal aging. Lifestyle features may also
be associated with differences in pathologic features such
as stroke or microvascular brain changes; whether they
could influence the aggregation of pathology such as amy-
loid plaques or tau tangles is an ongoing research question.
This would be a fundamental distinction between BM and
BR; BR, as noted previously, does not protect against the
accumulation of brain pathology, but it does protect against
the effects of the pathology itself.
BR and BMare fundamentally related concepts. It remains
an open question as to whether in fact they are the same
concept viewed at different timescales. By definition BM rep-
resents the process of maintaining, or perhaps enhancing, the
brain, whereas BR represents the status of the brain at a point
in time. BM refers to the reduction of the impact of primary
pathology (e.g., age-related brain changes) on brain integrity.
Better BM could thus sustain higher BR.
4.2. Measures of BM
Brain maintenance is best measured longitudinally, by
demonstrating relative preservation of brain morphology.
An alternate is a residual approach, where, for example, an in-
dividual’s current brain status is compared with the state typi-
cally expected at that age. Further longitudinal studies should
consider sociobehavioral CR proxies that change with time,
such as cognitive and leisure activities, as well as traditional
BR proxies to further refine putative measures of BM.5. Research considerations
5.1. Cognitive reserve
Research aimed at further elucidating CR requires the in-
clusion of three components—the status of the brain (reflect-
ing brain change or pathology), clinical or cognitive
performance outcomes, and a measure of reserve: either a
sociobehavioral proxy (i.e., an index of lifetime exposure/
premorbid ability) or a functional brain measure.
Ideally, the aim is to demonstrate that any proposed CR
proxy (sociocultural or functional brain measure) moderates
the relationship between an indicator of brain abnormality/
pathology and clinical/cognitive status. That is, cognitive
performance should be predicted by the interaction between
that proposed factor and brain/pathology status.
A simple correlation of cognitive test performance with a
sociobehavioral proxy of CR is not sufficient to establish that
the test performance reflects CR because it proves no insight
into how that influences the relationship between the brain
and clinical or cognitive performance outcome.
In some situations, perhaps for hypothesis generation, it
may be sufficient to demonstrate that a hypothesized CR
proxy or measure is associated with cognitive performance
after partialing out the effects of brain change, pathology,
or insult. For example, in a multiple regression analysis pre-
dicting cognition that includes brain atrophy/pathology mea-
sures and a hypothesized CR proxy, the proxy should account14 September 2018  3:29 pm  ce
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645for additional predictive variance. In this analysis, the newCR
proxy simply adds predictive information (a protective fac-
tor), a weaker form of CR evidence than moderation.
From a neurobiological point of view, CR remains a black
box. Research spanning human and animal models will be
required to elucidate CR at that level.
5.1.1. Example 1: A longitudinal study of the differential
risk of incident AD in people with higher or lower education
Here, the presence of comparable amounts of AD pathol-
ogy across educational groups is implicitly assumed. The
outcome is meeting the clinical diagnostic criteria for AD
at follow-up. Because education is known to be associated
with higher premorbid scores on many formal psychometric
measures, appropriate statistical methods must be used to
address the question of whether the diagnosis of AD is not
itself confounded with education, the proxy thought to
reflect CR. The underlying logic is that given equal underly-
ing AD-related brain changes, individuals with greater
educational exposure are less likely to become demented.
For an exposure to be considered as enhancing CR, it should
be associated with reduced incidence of a definitive clinical
outcome (such as the clinical expression of AD) given equiv-
alent level of neuropathology.
In epidemiological studies, risk factors for dementia are
sometimes used in the absence of brain measures. Although
completely uninformative of brain processes or pathology,
these models can test if individuals with higher levels of
CR proxies can tolerate higher risk factor levels.
5.1.2. Example 2: A cross-sectional study examining the
clinical severity of AD
An appropriate standard of research would be to
demonstrate that a putative protective factor or brain
feature moderates the relationship between underlying
AD-related brain changes and a clinical variable such as
cognition or day-to-day function. For example, one could
explore whether education moderates the relationship be-
tween clinical dementia severity and disease pathology,
the latter quantified in terms of amyloid/tau burden or pat-
terns of neurodegeneration, atrophy, hypometabolism, etc.
It should be noted that, although education may be iden-
tified as a moderator, in most situations, it would be inap-
propriate to assume causality. Therefore, cognitive or
neural mechanism that might underlie this effect still
needs to be investigated with a longitudinal or interven-
tion design.
5.1.3. Example 3: Longitudinal design incorporating
measures of brain and clinical change
For example, one could explore whether some life expo-
sure conceptually linked to CR moderates the relationship
between change in brain status (e.g., volume, white matter
tract integrity, white matter hyperintensity burden) and
change in cognition. One might expect that in individuals
with higher versus lower CR, the relationship between brainREV 5.5.0 DTD  JALZ2736_proof status and cognition is weaker because higher CR means
greater ability to adapt and therefore cognition will be less
susceptible to change in brain state.
5.1.4. Example 4: Functional imaging approaches to
studying CR
Various functional imaging approaches have been used to
try to quantify, better understand, or capture the “neural im-
plementation” of CR. It is important to consider the possibil-
ity that the neural implementation of CR might differ as a
function of different CR proxies and their related life expo-
sures.
One goal is to identify a functional network, either resting
or task-related, whose expression moderates the relationship
of brain status (e.g., volume, white matter tract integrity, am-
yloid burden) to cognition. Optimally the expression of that
network also correlates with a typical CR sociobehavioral
proxy. Such a network may help both measure CR and eluci-
date its neural substrate.
Other approaches can also elucidate the neural imple-
mentation of CR. Often a distinction is made between net-
works that preexist age-related brain changes or pathology
and those that emerge in response to these changes.
For preexisting networks, the supposition is that there is
natural interindividual variability in the brain networks that
underlie the performance of any task. This interindividual
variability could be influenced by CR-related exposures and
thus help represent the neural implementation of CR. Interin-
dividual variability could be in the formof differing efficiency
or capacity of functional brain networks, or in greater flexi-
bility in the networks that can be invoked to perform a task.
Although healthy individuals may invoke these networks in
response to day-to-day cognitive challenges, the networks
could also help an individual cope with brain changes: an in-
dividual whose networks are more efficient, have greater ca-
pacity, or are more flexible might be more capable of
coping with the disruption imposed by brain pathology.
Efficiency can be defined as the degree to which a given
task-related brain network must become activated to accom-
plish a given task. A more efficient network will show less
activation to produce the same (or better) level of perfor-
mance. Thus, an individual with greater efficiency will
show less task-related activation at a given level of task de-
mand. Capacity can be defined as the maximum degree to
which a task-related brain network can be activated to
keep performing a task in the face of increasing demands.
Again, this maximum capacity varies across individuals.
Higher CR might be associated with either greater efficiency
or capacity. The behavioral implication of flexibility is that
an individual with higher CR may have more varied solution
strategies available. This might be reflected by the ability to
utilize alternate networks during task performance that result
in more successful performance. Functional Qmagnetic reso-
nance imaging studies of this concept would require careful
application of these ideas to specific brain areas or networks
that are consistent with solution strategies for a specific task.14 September 2018  3:29 pm  ce




















































































729With regard to networks that emerge in response to brain
aging or pathology, the concept of compensation is often
invoked. In response to these brain changes, individuals
may recruit brain structures or networks (and thus cognitive
strategies) not normally used by individuals with “intact”
brains. Compensation can result in improved performance.
Alternately it could result in maintenance of performance,
but perhaps at a lower level then when compensation is
not required. Given a specific level of BR and brain pathol-
ogy, there are several possibilities. Higher CR could be asso-
ciated with the lack compensation (while compensation is
seen at lower levels of CR). Alternately, individuals with
higher CR may compensate more successfully to maintain

























Brain reserve can be studied cross-sectionally, looking for
new links between structural brain features and variability in
cognitive status with age, disease, or brain injury. In cross-
sectional studies, intracranial volume does not change as a
consequence of pathology, so it could be considered as a prac-
tical, convenient proxy of premorbid brain structure/size.
A goal of longitudinal studies could be to demonstrate
that a higher degree of some brain features (e.g., regional
volume, cortical surface area, patterns of cortical thickness,
white matter microstructural properties), measured before
the putative age- or pathology-related brain changes, is asso-
ciated with lower subsequent risk of reaching a clinical
outcome or of cognitive decline.
In animal studies, these questions might be addressed
directly, so that BR concepts might be developed that
encompass all scales from molecular to cellular to systems.
In such an experimental context, bridging to CR-like con-

























For BM, the goal is to demonstrate that a certain genetic
background or life exposure results in a healthier brain
outcome, for example, less rapid volume loss, less accumu-
lation of microvascular brain changes, less amyloid accumu-
lation or tau burden.
In the study of brain morphological features (for instance,
cortical thickness or brain volume), BR and BM cannot be
discriminated in cross-sectional designs. For instance, where
higher thickness is desirable, BR would postulate that those
with high reserve have thicker brains, whereas BM would
postulate that maintainers experience less loss of thickness.
Thus, in this case, a single timepointmeasurement cannot sepa-
rate highBR individuals frommaintainers.Making this distinc-
tion is complex but can be aided by a longitudinal design.
Where BM-related life exposures intersect with CR or
BR variables, there is considerable scope for these research
areas to enrich each other. A form of BM is also higher resis-
tance to the progression of primary pathology itself. Thus, aREV 5.5.0 DTD  JALZ2736_proof general approach to assess BM would be to examine longi-
tudinally if individuals vary in how much age- or disease-
related brain anomalies they accumulate over time and
assess which factors (e.g., genetic, lifestyle, neural) are asso-
ciated with different trajectories.
As in the case of BR, experimental neurobiological basic
research of BM and CR could generate mechanistic insights
that would aid the integration across the scales and domains.
Hard to define yet critical concepts such as “plasticity” at the
synaptic, cellular, and functional level as the fundamental
mechanistic basis of the relationship between structure and
function and their inherent mechanistic complexity would
need to be related to the ideas embodied in the constructs of
CR,BR, andBMto increase explanatory and predictive power.Acknowledgments
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